The Situation

At about 7:15 a.m. on Tuesday, August 25, 2026, a Colorado State Patrol trooper made a traffic stop on U.S. Highway 24 near Piney Point Lane, just west of Woodland Park in Teller County, Colorado. The driver opened fire. A second trooper arrived within minutes, followed the suspect into a nearby subdivision, and was also shot.

Both troopers survived. By State Patrol Chief Col. Matthew Packard's account, both drove themselves to the hospital and walked into the emergency room.

What Happened

  • The first trooper, a 15-year veteran, was seriously wounded. The Colorado Springs Gazette reported wounds to the neck, shoulder, and ribs, based on radio traffic in which the trooper described his injuries.
  • The second trooper, a 10-year veteran, was shot while responding in the subdivision. His injuries were less serious. He was treated and released the same day.
  • According to the Gazette, both troopers drove across the highway to UCHealth Pikes Peak Regional Hospital. The Teller County Sheriff's Office also said the troopers drove themselves.
  • The suspect fled, and residents were ordered to shelter in place. After a tip at 9:24 a.m., Teller County deputies found him. He fired at deputies, a deputy returned fire, and personnel on scene gave him medical aid before he was flown to the hospital, where he died.
  • The State Patrol reported that the seriously wounded trooper was released and recovering at home by that Thursday.

Packard said: "With an extreme sense of relief, both are going to be OK."

What is not public: what self-aid or buddy aid, if any, happened before the troopers reached the ER, what equipment they carried, how long the drive took, or what treatment they received at the hospital. The Colorado Bureau of Investigation is handling the investigation. We are not assuming any care was or was not given.

The Tactical Medical Lesson

This should not be retold as "they drove themselves and were fine." It turned out well partly because of something no officer controls: the hospital was across the highway. The lessons worth training come from the wound pattern and the fact that the first trooper was alone when hit.

A lone officer's first medic is himself. When the first rounds hit, no partner is there yet and EMS is not coming into an active shooting. TCCC tells casualties who are able to "move to cover and apply self-aid." That works only if the officer has trained it with either hand, under stress, from the position he will actually be in, including seated in a patrol car.

Many wounds are above the tourniquet line. The reported wounds, to the neck, shoulder, and ribs, are ones a limb tourniquet cannot treat. Training that ends at "apply a tourniquet" leaves this gap open. For bleeding a limb tourniquet cannot reach, the May 2026 TCCC guidelines name Combat Gauze as the hemostatic dressing of choice for "compressible (external) hemorrhage not amenable to limb tourniquet use." In practice that means wound packing and hard direct pressure, including on yourself. It is perishable, and a slideshow does not build it.

Chest wounds can get worse on the way. A torso hit can affect breathing. TCCC warns that untreated tension pneumothorax "may progress from respiratory distress to shock and traumatic cardiac arrest." Patrol officers should recognize worsening breathing and escalate fast. The advanced respiration intervention, finger thoracostomy with needle decompression, belongs to medical personnel trained and authorized to perform it under their protocols. It is not a patrol skill.

Self-transport is a decision, not a default. Driving yourself can make sense when definitive care is minutes away and waiting means staying in the threat area. On a rural stretch, or with a wound that worsens behind the wheel, the same choice can go wrong. Agencies should make that decision in policy, with their medical director, before an officer has to make it wounded and alone.

TECC/TCCC Relevance

Colorado troopers work under civilian protocols. For them, the relevant framework is Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC), developed by the Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care for civilian high-threat operations. The military TCCC guidelines quoted above come from the CoTCCC and are cited for their clinical reasoning, not as a patrol protocol.

The Joint Trauma System's (Wartime) Thoracic Injury CPG and its Tactical Combat Casualty Care Guidelines CPG cover the evidence on torso trauma and point-of-injury care. Both are military documents. The shared principle carries over to civilian patrol: control what bleeding you can, protect the airway and breathing, and shorten the time to a surgeon.

What Your Agency Should Do Now

  • Mount the tourniquet and hemostatic gauze on the officer, reachable with either hand while seated in the car and while prone.
  • Train self-packing and self-pressure, not only self-applied tourniquets, including simulated wounds to the shoulder and upper chest.
  • Teach breathing-compromise recognition and a clear escalation path to the nearest capable medical asset.
  • Write a self-transport and officer-transport policy with your medical director: when to drive, when to wait, and when a partner drives.
  • Map the nearest trauma-capable hospital for every patrol area, especially rural ones, and include drive times in briefings.
  • Drill the "officer down" radio call: location, wounds, direction of the threat, and where you are going.
  • Train lone-officer scenarios. Plan for the first minutes of an event happening before backup arrives.

Bottom Line

Two troopers went home, and we are glad for them and their families. The lesson is not that driving yourself works. It is that the first minutes after an officer is shot often depend on self-aid, on wounds a tourniquet cannot fix, and on geography no one controls. Train for the version of this call where the hospital is not across the highway.

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